When the United States acquired the territory of California, it became the common property of all the people of all the States, and the right of emigration with every species of property belonging to the citizens was inherent with its use and possession. By the fifth article of the amendments of the Constitution, it is expressly provided, " that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law, nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." The sixth article declares, "that the Constitution and the laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." The constitution of California must therefore, be so interpreted as not to conflict with it. It is clear, therefore, that no organic or statute law of California can take away any right, or confiscate any property guaranteed by the supreme law of the land. These negroes, therefore, being property as before shown, when brought into California so remained, and the present law for their reclamation is simply as it should be, executory of the 18th section of the 1st article of the Constitution.

In connection with all these views, there is another, which, to my mind, is perfectly conclusive. Separate and apart from all others it is entitled to great weight. The 18th section of the 1st article of the Constitution declares, "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, unless for the punishment of crimes, shall ever be tolerated in this State. There is no provision there for emancipation. The owners of slaves, under that section, had a perfect right, without anything further, to take them out of the State. The section asserts a principle, and so asserts it as to intend evidently future legislation to carry it out. It is, as it stands, inert and inoperative, and has so remained up to the date of the passage of the law now under consideration. It was of itself nonexecutory.

This principle has been conclusively settled by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Grove et al. v. Slaughter, 15 Pet. 499 and 500, and so on.

The opinion was delivered by Justice THOMPSON. The question was, whether the prohibition in the Constitution of Mississippi, as to the introduction of slaves for sale, per se, interdicts their importation and sale, or was directory, and required legislation. The learned Justice said, "There is every reason to believe from the mere naked prohibition, that it looked to legislative enactments to carry it into full operation. And indeed this is indisputable. There are no penalties or securities provided in the Constitution, for its due and effectual operation. Legislative provision is indispensable to carry into effect the object of this prohibition. It requires the sanction of penalties to affect this object." He also adds, " The legislative enactments of this subject strongly fortify the conclusion, that this provision in the Constitution was not understood as a prohibition, per se, but only directory to the Legislature."

This is exactly parallel with the case now before us, and the ruling of the Court is in conformity with this opinion. The reason therefore, ex cathedra, and the legislation in this case was not only wise, but a duty, if we are to consider the opinions of the Supreme Court as a rule for our judicial guidance.