Arizona Supreme Court affirms the dismissal of civil claims against the Church and its bishops in the Bisbee child sexual abuse case.
Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, and John Doe v. The Corporation of the President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, CV-25-0213-PR (Arizona Supreme Court, July 30, 2026)
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The Reporting Statute and bedrock First Amendment principles compel our decision in favor of the Church Defendants in the Does’ civil action against the Church Defendants for withholding reporting of Paul’s abuse.
Our decision “does not mean that religious institutions enjoy a general immunity from secular laws . . . .” Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 591 U.S. at 746. “Courts of law may adjudicate disputes arising in religious contexts ‘by applying neutral principles of law without inquiry into religious doctrine and without resolving a religious controversy[.]’” Alulddin, 255 Ariz. at 440 ¶ 11 (quoting Rashedi, 203 Ariz. at 324 ¶¶ 15–16).
However, as the United States Supreme Court has recognized, there is room only for “marginal civil court review under the narrow rubrics of ‘fraud’ or ‘collusion’ when church tribunals act in bad faith for secular purposes . . . .” Serbian E. Orthodox, 426 U.S. at 713; Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 306. Thus, if a court finds a religious institution submitted evidence procured through “fraud” or “collusion” for secular purposes, it will lose the Religion Clauses’ protection. See Serbian E. Orthodox, 426 U.S. at 713; Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 306.
Such inquiries are permissible because they ask how or why a religious institution’s evidence was procured, rather than what the evidence means under the religious doctrine. Consequently, if a matter involving a religious institution can be resolved by applying neutral principles of law, the “ecclesiastical abstention” doctrine would not apply.
In this case, however, there is no evidence that the Church Defendants’ factual allegations were procured by “fraud” or “collusion” for the secular purpose of avoiding legal responsibilities, and any inquiry into whether the Bishops adhered to Church doctrine is the antithesis of the permissible narrow review—the application of “neutral principles of law without inquiry into religious doctrine and without resolving a religious controversy[.]’” See Alulddin, 255 Ariz. at 440 ¶ 11 (quoting Rashedi, 203 Ariz. at 324 ¶¶ 15–16). On this record, and consistent with the Reporting Statute’s Clergy Exemption, the First Amendment forecloses any such inquiry.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we vacate the court of appeals’ memorandum decision and affirm the trial court’s ruling granting the Church Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.